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1. Constitutional Courts and the European integration
In the first few months of 2004 both experts and the general public focused their attention on
the Czech Constitutional Court once more. The reason for this were problems concerning the
appointment of new judges, the temporary reduced size of the Constitutional Court resulting in
a loss of its competence to assess compliance of laws with the Constitution, and, last but not
least, the disputes between the Czech President and the Senate over the possible constitutional
implications of vacancies in the Constitutional Court. The issue that has been discussed only
marginally is the role of the Constitutional Court in the integration of the Czech Republic into
the European Union.
The integration process of the Member States’ Constitutional Courts into the European structures
follows two lines (which are only partly interrelated): firstly, it is the communication between
the domestic Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice; secondly, the role of the
domestic Constitutional Court in the disputes related to the Community.
The history of the European integration shows most varied approaches of the Constitutional
Courts to these cases as well as their conflicts with the European Court of Justice and other
bodies involved in the European integration. The conflicts can be divided into two main groups:
 particular disputes over the application or non-application of the EC law in the Member State
when the Constitutional Court is, as a last resort, asked to act against the application of the
European legislation that is allegedly contradictory to domestic legal standards;
 abstract disputes when the Constitutional Court obstructs ratification of changes to the
European primary legislation on the grounds that the sovereignty of the State would be
infringed.
France, Ireland, and Germany represent three different systems of the constitutional judiciary
(France = the Constitutional Council, Ireland = the Supreme Court, Germany = the
Constitutional Court) that have been in various periods of their existence involved in both sorts
of conflicts with the European law. However, similar conflicts have arisen elsewhere too (Italy,
Denmark).
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France 
The French Constitutional Council ignored the specificities of the European integration until
1992. This approach was based primarily on the absence of an explicit reference to the
existence of the EC in the French 1958 Constitution. Although the French Constitution was
enacted after the Treaty of Rome had been signed, there was no explicit mention of the EC in
its original wording. There was only a marginal note referring to the EC indirectly in the clause
on international agreements. The international agreements that have been duly ratified and
declared are in France immediately applicable and they take precedence over the legislation;
this approach is based on the traditional French monism that is similar to the current Czech
constitutional clause on international agreements.
The Constitutional Council refused to assess the compatibility of the European secondary
legislation with the French legislation and left the decision-making procedure in these cases to
general courts. By this the French constitutional tradition soon got into conflict with the
principle of supremacy of the EC law that had been formulated by the ECJ. The "Matter
Doctrine", which dates back to the period between the First and the Second World War,
acknowledged precedence of the international agreements over older French legislation only in
cases when the agreement was ratified after the law opposing the given international
commitment had been adopted. The Matter Doctrine was abandoned as early as in the 1960s
by the French Cassation Court but the French Supreme Administrative Court (Conseil d’Etat)
followed the Doctrine until the late 1980s and early 1990s when it was abandoned, as a different
line was endorsed by the new generation. The Constitutional Court, whose passivity was
indirectly responsible for this constitutional crisis around the French membership in the EC, was
not directly involved in the issue.
The Constitutional Court was, on the other hand, a key institution in the ratification of the
Maastricht and the Amsterdam Treaty, where it defined the limits of French sovereignty as well
as the possibility to adapt these limits for international institutions. In 1992 the Constitutional
Council obstructed the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty until the French Constitution was
explicitly amended according to the requirements of the Constitutional Council. The
Constitutional Council declared a part of the Maastricht Treaty (e.g. the chapters on EU
citizenship and on the monetary union) as contradictory to the wording of the French
Constitution. The grounds for this ruling were that it did not comply with general authorization
to devolution of competences to international institutions that was tacitly mentioned in the
French Constitution. A similar scenario was followed in the case of the Amsterdam Treaty, some
parts of which were also declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Council (cross-border
movement of people, the asylum and the visa policy) – the ratification was conditioned by an
amendment to the Constitution.
Ireland
The Supreme Court of Ireland belongs to the system of general courts but it has the power to
check on the compatibility of ordinary legislation with the Irish Constitution. An amendment to
the Irish Constitution (adopted before the accession to the EEC in 1973) enabled ratification of
the Accession Treaty. However, after the adoption of the Single European Act, the Irish Supreme
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Court ruled in "Crotty v. Taoiseach" case that modifications of the European primary legislation
"by which the extent or targets of the EC undergo significant changes" may be ratified only on
the basis of an amendment to the Constitution and an explicit constitutional authorisation to the
ratification of a new treaty. According to the Supreme Court the implementation of "political
cooperation" in the Single European Act came under the category of such modifications. The
ratification of the Single European Act was therefore preceded by a modification of the Irish
Constitution (conditioned by a referendum). Similarly, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty,
the Amsterdam Treaty and the Nice Treaty was accompanied by corresponding amendments,
though admittedly, without a judicial intervention.
In Ireland, the free movement of people and services guaranteed by the Community law
entered into conflict with the protection of human life in pregnancy as established in the Irish
Constitution. In the 1990s a series of judicial disputes in Ireland dealt with legitimacy of the
attempts made by State to curb rights of Irish female citizens to travel to the EU Member States
in order to obtain abortions (Attorney General v. X in 1992, Attorney General v. C in 1998).
Much concern was also raised by the ban that was imposed on information campaigns
organized by independent organizations for women’s rights about the possibilities of abortion
practised abroad (Dublin Well Woman, Open Door Counselling). These disputes accompanied
by an intervention of the Supreme Court resulted in a constitutional compromise. Article 40.3.3
of the Constitution (the protection of human life in pregnancy and criminalization of abortions)
was amended in the sense that "Article 40.3.3 shall not limit freedom to travel between the State
and another state" and that "it shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the State,
subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information relating to services lawfully
available in another state".
Germany
The attitude of the German Constitutional Court to the European integration has, too,
undergone an interesting development. The first constitutional crisis was started in 1974 when
the Constitutional Court declared in its judgment referred to as "Solange I" that the protection
of human rights guaranteed by the German "Fundamental Law" (Grundgesetz) would be
principally based on German standards rather than on the European law. The Constitutional
Court did not change its attitude until 1986, i.e. twelve years later, when it issued a judgment
referred to as "Solange II" in which the efficiency of human rights protection established in the
EC law was declared as comparable with the protection in the German Constitution. The
Constitutional Court also ruled that as long as this efficiency was preserved, there was no need
to review compatibility of the European legal norms with the German constitutional law. The
same attitude has been taken by the Constitutional Court in the recent "Banana Judgment". In
this case the Constitutional Court was asked to assess compatibility of the new regime for
banana import into the EU (Regulation 404/93) with the German legal system.
An intervention of the Constitutional Court marked also the German ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was
preceded by an amendment to the "Fundamental Law". Do The "European Article" No. 23, by
which the German membership in the European Union became explicitly authorized, was
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inserted into the text of the Constitution. However, the compatibility between the "Europa-
Artikel" and what is referred to as the "super-rigid" articles of the German "Fundamental Law"
was challenged, and the ensuing dispute was brought before the Constitutional Court; the
"Europa-Artikel" was alleged to oppose the principle of democracy and people’s sovereignty.
The Constitutional Court declared the membership in the European Union as compatible with
the German constitutional order but it also defined the limits for the further development of the
European integration. 
2. Formal integration of the Czech Constitutional Court into the ECJ
The relation between the Czech Constitutional Court and the European integration has been
formally established by the Euro-amendment to the Czech Constitution and the related
Constitutional Law about referendum on the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU. Due to the
Euro-amendment international agreements may be directly effective (Article 10) and the powers
of the Czech Republic may de devolved on international institutions (Article 10a). Further, the
Euro-amendment has enabled to redefine powers held by general courts (assessment of
compatibility between laws and international commitments of the Czech Republic) and by the
Constitutional Court (preliminary review of compatibility between the Czech constitutional
order and the international agreements signed by the Czech Republic). It is also important that
a general clause declaring the duty of the Czech Republic to respect the international law was
inserted into the constitutional text. The latest case-law of the Constitutional Court, however,
suggests that the Constitutional Court itself could possibly interpret the Euro-amendment
differently than the legislators have actually expected – in particular by declaring different
standards for dealing with international agreements on human rights v. other international
agreements.
Another way of "communication" between the Constitutional Court and the ECJ or other EU
bodies is the review of the European secondary legislation (+ agreements made by the EC
where a preliminary review of compatibility with primary legislation before the ECJ is also
possible). The Constitutional Court is not a privileged participant – therefore, it is not entitled
to contest European norms unless it meets the requirements stated for an unprivileged
participant; i.e. the Constitutional Court must be addressee of the relevant norm or it is necessary
that the condition of "direct and immediate impact" on the Court be satisfied. Another possibility
is that the Constitutional Court will initiate further action and the norm will be contested in the
name of the Czech Republic.
The activity or passivity of the Constitutional Court can also provoke the European Commission
to file an enforcement action against the Czech Republic for non-fulfilment of the acquis
communautaire (to be decided by the European Court of Justice) or private parties can sue the
Czech Republic for damages ensuing from breach of the EC law by Czech judiciary (the decision
in this case will be left to the Czech domestic court). In situations when the European law is
breached by a Member State, the ECJ rejects to regard the judicial independence as an
exculpating fact. The latest ECJ case-law (cases "Köbbler" and "Commission v. Italy", C-120/00)
suggests not only an increasing tendency of the ECJ to identify breaches of the European law
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by acts of judicial power but also to stress the fact that the State is held responsible for such
breaches to private entities.
3. The formal domestic role of the Constitutional Court before the
enlargement
Before the accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union the Constitutional Court was
already enabled, at least in theory, by the "Euro-amendment" to engage in the process of the
European integration. The fact that the Constitutional Court did not make use of this possibility
did not in any way hamper the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU.
On the basis of the Euro-amendment the Constitutional Court is entitled to review compatibility
of the Czech constitutional order with international agreements signed by the Czech Republic.
So far the Constitutional Court has not been commissioned to make such a review but such a
situation will supposedly arise when it comes to the ratification of the Treaty establishing a
European Constitution.
One of the more traditional tasks of the Constitutional Court was to exercise supervision over
the referendum on accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union, as regards to its
legality and regularity. The Constitutional Court rejected all complaints against the referendum.
Similarly, the allegations that the referendum was unconstitutional as the public finances
provided for the Euro-sceptic and Euro-optimistic information campaigns had not been justly
distributed were dismissed by the Constitutional Court as unsubstantiated.
4. The formal domestic role of the Constitutional Court after the enlargement
The sphere of the Constitutional Court’s competences has been much larger since 1 May 2004.
The Euro-amendment has assigned the duty to assess compatibility between the Czech and the
EU legislation to Czech general courts. It has been left open to discussion whether this form of
review allows the EU to retain its powers to supervise at least the compatibility of the Czech
legislation with international human rights agreements. This possibility has been already
suggested by the Constitutional Court. The situation in the first years of the EU membership
when the passivity of Czech general courts might result in their failure to assess compliance of
the Czech legislation with international commitments would thereby be at least partially solved
by the activist Constitutional Court.
The Constitutional Court is also entitled to submit preliminary questions to the European Court
of Justice. With regard to the preliminary question the Constitutional Court is considered by the
EC law to be a "court or tribunal of the Member State", which is entitled to submit preliminary
questions to the ECJ relating to interpretation or applicability of the European law. The question
is whether the Constitutional Court is actually bound to submit the preliminary questions or not.
The former interpretation could be upheld by the fact that in the domestic legislation there is
no remedy against the judgments made by the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court
can, however, take a different line here. For example in the case of a constitutional complaint,
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it can adjudge that the general court that failed to submit preliminary question infringed the
rights guaranteed by the legal system of the Czech Republic. In this situation the Constitutional
Court will not refer to the ECJ in its own name but it will reverse the judgment of the
corresponding general court against which the complaint was lodged and call on the general
court to refer to the ECJ autonomously.
It has not been solved yet whether the possibility to refer to the ECJ should be explicitly
regulated in the Constitutional Court Act. Czech legislators should also consider introducing a
new institution to the constitutional judiciary that would be analogous to the "re-trial" ("obnova
ﬁízení") before the Constitutional Court in case that new case-law of the European Court of
Justice emerged that conflicts with the original jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. This
would be, once again, a reaction to the latest trends in the ECJ case-law (Kühne & Heitz, C-
453/2000). A modification of the Constitutional Court’s procedural legislation would also make
it possible to revise past resolutions of the Constitutional Court with respect to the decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights.
Moreover, the first year of the EU membership will probably answer the question whether the
term "international agreement" regulated in Article 10 of the Constitution covers also the
European (obligatory) secondary legislation – this will be crucial for direct effect of regulations,
decisions and (to some extend) directives in Czech legal order. Further, it is necessary to define
the position of the Constitutional Court in the review of compatibility between the Czech legal
norms and international human rights agreements. Surprisingly enough, the Constitutional Court
insisted that these be treated separately from other international agreements (ruling No.
406/2002) even if the decision on their privileged status had been revoked by Article 10 of the
Euro-amendment.
5. The informal relation of the Constitutional Court to the European
integration
Despite the formal relations regulated by both the Czech constitutional legislation and the
European law, the definition of relationship between the Constitutional Court and the ECJ may
still be affected by personal links or the domestic legal culture. The main questions are the
following:
 Can the attitude of the Constitutional Court be influenced by the current appointment of its
members? Has the relation to the European integration been discussed in the debate concerning
the Senate's approval or disapproval with the candidates nominated by the President?
 Which implications for the relationship between the Constitutional Court and the ECJ will have
the fact that the first judge from the Czech Republic in the ECJ was originally a member of the
Constitutional Court?
 Informal contacts of the ECJ judge from the Czech Republic with the Czech judiciary. According
to the EC Treaty, ECJ judges are obliged to act independently of the Member States by which
they were appointed. The same rule is applicable e.g. to the European Commissioners, whose
contact with the domestic environment is in fact never suspended. Can a similar scenario be
applied in the case of the ECJ judge from the Czech Republic?
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6. Scenarios
The position of the Czech Constitutional Court towards the European integration can
basically develop in three ways:
Scenario I – Cooperation and coordination
The Czech Constitutional Court will adopt acquis communautaire and the doctrine of its
of unconditional supremacy as an integral part of the Czech constitutional and legal
system. The Czech Constitutional Court often refers to the ECJ. It also tries to get actively
involved in the formulation of new EC norms – its involvement in the creation of the
norms is either direct or indirect, the latter being procured by the Ministry of Justice or
by a judicial review of the secondary legislation initiated by a complaint filed by the
Czech Republic. The Constitutional Court revokes the Czech legal norms in reaction to
the ECJ case-law – by doing this, the Constitutional Court exceeds the requirements of
the EC law which demands supremacy in application but not in validity.
Scenario II – Peaceful coexistence 
The attitude of the Constitutional Court to the existence of the ECJ is rather indifferent.
It regards the Czech and the European legal systems as two separated systems whose
relationship can be described as a "peaceful coexistence". The Constitutional Court does
not refer to the ECJ. The communication with the ECJ is for the most part devolved on
general courts. The scenario of the "peaceful coexistence" has its relevancy especially in
view of the fact that the failure of the Czech courts to perform their legal obligations
and refer to the ECJ with a preliminary question is deemed by the Constitutional Court
to be an infringement on the due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Scenario III - Conflict
The Czech Constitutional Court explicitly declares that some parts of the Czech legal
system are superior both to the current and the future EC law (human rights, issues
connected with the Bene‰ Decrees, nuclear energy policy), which in fact leads to the
creation of a Czech analogy to the German "Solange" in areas that the Constitutional
Court considers as enormously sensitive. The constitutional complaints against non-
application of the European law by the Czech public administration and general courts
are rejected. The Constitutional Court obstructs further devolvement of competence on
the EU that is regulated by Article 10a; it requires an explicit modification of the
Constitution or it formulates a doctrine of the State’s "super-sovereignty" that cannot be
transferred onto any other international institution.
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